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CASE NOTES
Civil Rights-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-
Seniority Provisions of Union Collective Bargaining Agreement
Held Controlling Over EEOC Affirmative Action Hiring Pro-
gram. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508
F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
Plaintiff, Jersey Central Power & Light Company (Jersey Cen-
tral), a large public utility, was economically forced to announce a
series of plant wide layoffs.' The collective bargaining agreement in
force between Jersey Central and various unions required that lay-
offs be conducted in reverse order of seniority, i.e., the last person
hired is the first person to be fired.' A conciliation agreement
among Jersey Central, the unions and the Federal Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) called for the company to
begin an affirmative action program designed to increase employ-
1. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508F.2d 687,
696 (3d Cir. 1975).
2. The collective bargaining between Jersey Central and the Unions
provides in pertinent part: "1.1(d) The Company [Jersey Central] and
the Union[s] agree that the application of the various provisions of this
agreement shall in no way serve to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment or otherwise affect his status as an employee because of such
individual's race, color, creed, ancestry, religion, national origin, sex, age,
place of birth, marital status or liability for service in the Armed Forces
of the United States . . . . 3.2(a) All layoffs, or demotions occasioned
because of falling off or curtailment of work, shall be discussed with the
Union two weeks in advance of the layoff and shall be made in order of
seniority. No senior employee shall be laid off as long as any work which
he can reasonably be expected to do is being performed by an employee
junior in point of service. 3.3 Employees who have been laid off shall be
reinstated to employment as need for their services arises, in the reverse
order of their layoff. 3.4 Seniority is defined as length of continuous service
with the Company." See Brief for Appellants/Union at 2-3, Jersey Central
Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975). The
parties to the collective bargaining agreement were Jersey Central and
seven locals of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Locals
327, 749, 1289, 1298, 1303, 1309, and 1314.
3. See notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text.
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ment opportunities for women and minority workers. Plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court4 as to its
rights and obligations under the collective bargaining agreement,
the conciliation agreement, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII)5 and Executive Order 11246.6
4. See notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text.
5. Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-(17),
as amended, (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as "Title VII"]. Title VII was
enacted in 1964 and went into effect on July 2, 1965. The act was intended
to eliminate discriminatory employment in federal agencies, private busi-
nesses doing business with the federal government and all other private
concerns which met the statutory requirements for compliance. The rele-
vant provisions of Title VII are: Section 2000e-2(a): "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Section 2000e-2(c) (Labor Organization Practices)
places the same burden of non-discrimination applicable to employers
upon "labor organizations:" "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for a labor organization - (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership,
or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its
membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse
to refer for employment any -individual, in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would
limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his sta-
tus as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in
violation of this section." Section 2000e-2(h) specifically allows the estab-
lishment of "bona fide seniority or merit" systems: "(h) Notwithstanding
any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority or merit system. . . provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . ." Section 2000e-2(j) specifically pro-
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Plaintiff named various locals of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (the Union),7 the EEOC, the Office of Federal
hibits the granting of "preferential treatment" to any group because of
imbalances existing between percentages of minorities employed in a given
place of employment and the minority population of the surrounding com-
munity: "(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . . in comparison with the total number
of [sic] percentage of such persons . . . in any community, State, section,
or other area or in the available work force in any community, State,
section, or other area."
6. Exec. Order No. 11246, as amended, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974). 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1970) provides that all federal agencies and contractors doing
business with the federal government must comply with the provisions of
Title VII.
7. 508 F.2d at 691.
8. Title VII establishes the EEOC and grants this agency enforcement
powers to ensure compliance with the act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(4) establishes
the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973), defines
its enforcement powers: "(a) The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter
provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employ-
ment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title. (b)
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer,
employment agency, [or] labor organization . . .has engaged in an un-
lawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the
charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice) . . .within ten days,[to the parties concerned]
and shall make an investigation thereof. . . . If the Commission deter-
mines after such investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge . . . .If the Commission
determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. . . .(f) (1) If. . .the Commis-
sion has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agree-
ment acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil
action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision named in the charge. . . . (g) If the court finds that
the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in
1975]
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Contract Compliance (OFCC), the General Services Administra-
tion (GSA),"° and the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights' as defen-
dants. Jersey Central took no position as to which of the two agree-
ments must govern the proposed layoffs. 2 The district court held
that the layoffs could not alter the pre-layoff minority proportion of
the work force by more than fifteen percent." On appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed and held that layoffs were to be effectuated in
accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.'4
Plaintiff employed 3,859 workers of whom 2,877 were represented
by the Union. 5 The EEOC had filed charges against plaintiff and
the Unions alleging that both parties "unlawfully discriminated
against women and 'minority group persons,' in violation of Title
an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or
labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful em-
ployment practice), or any other equitable relief the court deems appropri-
ate." For an excellent treatment of the powers of the EEOC, see Berg, Title
VII: A Three-Years' View, 44 NoTuR DAME LAW. 311 (1969). For a detailed
examination of EEOC enforcement procedures, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-
.33 (1974); Note, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
9. 508 F.2d at 691. The OFCC has been charged by the Secretary of
Labor with enforcing the provisions of Title VII involving federal contrac-
tors. See 41 C.F.R. chs. 60-1 to 60-60. Jersey Central had been designated
a federal contractor. Brief for Appellant OFCC and GSA at 8.
10. The GSA and OFCC have concurrent enforcement powers under
Executive Order 11246. Brief for Appellant OFCC and GSA at 8.
11. 508 F.2d at 691.
12. Id.
13. See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 8 F.E.P.
690, 694 (D.N.J. 1974).
14. 508 F.2d at 710.
15. Id. at 694.
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."11 The EEOC found "reasonable
cause" to believe that the Union and plaintiff had been guilty of
discriminatory employment practices under Title VII. 7 After nego-
tiations among plaintiff, the Union, and the EEOC, a conciliation
agreement to be effective from December 1973 to December 1977
was executed by the parties. 8 Jersey Central and the Union agreed
16. Id. See note 8 supra for a discussion of the EEOC's enforcement
powers under Title VII.
17. The EEOC found that there was "reasonable cause" to believe that
Jersey Central had discriminated against "minority group persons and
females with respect to hiring and job assignments." 508 F.2d at 694. The
Union was charged with having discriminated against women "by virtue
of the maternity leave provisions in the collective bargaining agreement."
Id. at 694 n.16. The EEOC decision is docketed at Case No. YNK-063 (Jan.
19, 1973).
18. The pertinent portions of the conciliation agreement are as follows:
"Section I-General Provisions 1. It is understood that this Agreement does
not constitute an admission by the Respondents [Jersey Central] of any
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ....
3. The Commission [EEOC] agrees not to sue the Respondents over mat-
ters contained in this Agreement subject to Respondent's compliance with
the promises and representations contained herein. . . [4.] This does
not preclude individual Charging Parties, or the Commission itself, from
filing charges or suit over new matters or practices which may arise with
respect to practices of the Respondents. 5. Respondents agree that all
hiring and promotion practices, and any and all other conditions of
employment (emphasis added) shall be maintained and conducted in a
manner which does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed,
ancestry, religion, sex, national origin, age, place of birth, marital status
or liability for services in the armed forces of the United States in violation
of . . .[the] Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. . . ." Section III of
the conciliation agreement. . . obligates Jersey Central to make reasona-
ble efforts to: "recruit minorities and females into those craft areas where
such jobs are to be filled by new hires, where they have heretofore been
under utilized or not employed." Concerning the establishment of senior-
ity for such newly hired minority employees, the agreement provides that
they may be given credit for experience gained with other employers and
may be initially assigned to jobs above the entry level. Section III, Para-
graph 10 states that: "The wages, benefits, other conditions of employment
and seniority date of such employee shall be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Section V of
the conciliation agreement provides for a five year affirmative action pro-
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not to discriminate in hiring practices and Jersey Central agreed to
make reasonable efforts to recruit "minorities and females." In ad-
dition, newly hired minorities were to be given credit "for experience
gained in the craft with other employers . . .,.1
In July, 1974 plaintiff announced its layoffs. It estimated that the
total number of employees to be affected would reach approxi-
mately 400 by December. 0 The Union insisted that Jersey Central
conduct the layoffs in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement." The EEOC advised the company that basing layoffs on
seniority would destroy any gains made by minorities under the
conciliation agreement and'would violate Title VII and Executive
Order 11246.2
Plaintiff, confronted with apparent contradictory obligations
under the two agreements, asked the district court to determine its
rights and obligations.23
In August, 1974, plaintiff commenced its layoffs in reverse
order of seniority as required by the provisions of the collective bar-
gram designed to increase the percentage of minority group employees in
all levels of the employee structure, including job categories not covered
by the collective bargaining agreement. 508 F.2d at 694-95.
19. See note 18 supra.
20. 508 F.2d at 696.
21. Id.
22. Id. The EEOC opposed the intended layoffs on the basis of senior-
ity in both the district court and on appeal. The gravamen of the EEOC's
argument was that the disproportionate effect the layoffs would have on
minorities if conducted according to seniority (20 percent of the minority
employees were scheduled for layoffs as opposed to approximately 4 per-
cent of the remainder of the workforce) was indicative of a practice that
was "fair in form, but discriminatory in practice." See Brief of Appellant
EEOC at 32-33.
23. 508 F.2d at 691. At the same time Jersey Central was instituting
its declaratory judgment action, it submitted the question of whether the
seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement were valid to
arbitration, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
697. On August 21, 1974, the arbitrator held that the proposed layoffs
would not be violative of the non-discrimination provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement but made no ruling as to the validity of the layoff
procedures in the context of a challenge based on alleged violation of the
conciliation agreement. Id.
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gaining agreement. On the same date, contending that "it faced
multiple suits for back pay,24 irreparable injury to itself and to the
public, and severe financial inroads on its resources," 4 plaintiff
moved for a show cause order requiring "the defendants to show
cause why summary judgement should not be granted 'declaring the
respective rights of the parties and whether plaintiff [the Com-
pany] violated its collective bargaining agreement with [the
Union] defendants . . . and the Conciliation Agreement entered
into on December 3, 1973 by the layoff . . . of [designated] em-
ployees ... ' "5
As of August 30, 1974, plaintiff had laid off or designated for
termination 176 employees. Of this number, 54, or 30.7 percent,
were male or female minority group persons. 6 As a result, the
minority group representation in the "bargaining units" decreased
from 7.9 percent to 6.4 percent. 7 On September 5, 1974, the district
court granted plaintiff partial summary judgment," holding that
the layoffs could not alter the pre-layoff proportion of minority em-
ployees by more than fifteen percent. 9 Furthermore, the district
court found that the dispute did not involve a controversy under
24. Id. at 692. Back pay awards are part of the EEOC enforcement
procedures available to deal with violations of Title VII. See note 8 supra.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 697. See also Brief of Appellant EEOC at 14, stating that
"total minority group employment fell 20 percent from 258 to 204, while
total white employment fell slightly less than 6 percent from 3844 to 3660
27. 508 F.2d at 697. Total female employment including both minority
and non-minority workers actually increased slightly during the initial
lay-off period from 14.6% of the total work force to 15.2% Id.
28. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local No. 327, IBEW, 8 E.P.D.
9759 (D.N.J. 1974).
29. In arriving at the fifteen percent figure the court reasoned: "the
parties should realize that the achievement of exact percentages is proba-
bly impossible under any system. In the first place, employees come in
complete units. . . . You've either got one or two, so there are going to be
distortions for that reason alone, and other unavoidable conditions will
undoubtably result in some variation from theoretically ideal proportions
on that basis, and the Court would be inclined to suggest that a deviation
either way not greater than 15 percent of the theoretical ideal would have
to be regarded as acceptable. . . ." Id. Though the court recognized the
problems involved in effectuating layoffs without regard to a seniority
system, it failed to adequately deal with the problem, preferring to allow
1975]
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Title VII, but rather the interpretation of two conflicting contracts
- the conciliation agreement and the collective bargaining agree-
ment . 0
The court of appeals agreed that the dispute was grounded in
contract law and not Title VII.1' However, unlike the district court,
it found that the conciliation agreement and the collective bargain-
ing agreement were not in conflict, and that the seniority provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement did not "frustrate" the provi-
sions of the conciliation agreement.2 The court also held that the
the parties to present suggested solutions. Id. Before any of these sugges-
tions could be presented or implemented the court's order was stayed by
the Third Circuit. For a discussion of alternate means of effectuating lay-
offs, see notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
30. 8 E.P.D. 9759. The court stated: "I don't see basically that Title
Seven is involved at all. . . . There is no need to look at the statute.
You have got a contract. You have got two contracts, and the objective
of one is in conflict with the objective of the other, and the conflict has
got to be resolved. That is what declaratory judgment relief is about."
Id. In determining which of the two agreements was to prevail in the
conducting of the proposed layoffs, the court held: "An affirmative action
program with a target some five years later is the kind of thing whose
purpose would be utterly frustrated if in a situation of the kind now faced
here, the layoffs were to be effectuated solely in accordance with the senior-
ity clause. This does not mean that a seniority clause in and of itself is
discriminatory. On the contrary, everything that the Court has been able
to find indicates that such clauses are inherently valid. The difficulty is
in its application in the context of the affirmative action program which
has been developed through the EEOC contract, that it would have a
frustrating effect, and even though it might not be discriminatory the
fact of frustration calls for construction of a seniority clause in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement which would make it possible to carry forward
the objectives of both agreements to the fullest extent possible. This
requires an accommodation of their provisions." Id.
31. 508 F.2d at 700.
32. The court found that the conciliation agreement: "[h]as, as its
objective, the percentage increase of females and minority group persons
among employees. This objective was to be attained by the Company
hiring a greater percentage of minority group and female workers-not
by resort to a system of 'artificial' seniority." Id. at 701. The court
apparently found it significant that the conciliation agreement made no
attempt to modify the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
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seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement were not
against "public policy. '3 In addition, the court examined the over-
all effect of the layoffs to ascertain whether the "seniority system,
although facially neutral, nevertheless violates Title VII in that it
operates to carry forward the effect of prior acts of discrimination. '34
The court of appeals found that in the collective bargaining agree-
ment there was a "bona fide seniority system" permitted under
Title VII,31 and:
concerning layoffs. In fact, the conciliation agreement affirmatively
adopted the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement:
"The wages, benefits, other conditions of employment and seniority date
of such employee [minorities hired under the conciliation agreement]
shall be determined in accordance with provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement." Id. at 702.
33. Though the court initially stated that Jersey Central was grounded
in contract law, it used the concept of a public policy argument to begin
its analysis of Title VII. The court looked to the standard of "public policy"
enunciated in Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (1945). In Mus-
chany, the Supreme Court stated that since determination of whether a
contract was void as against public policy was a "vague" standard, there
"must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify
the invalidation of a contract as contrary to . . .[public] policy." Id. at
66. Using this interpretation as a guideline, the Jersey Central court inter-
preted the two agreements at issue in light of the "Constitution, treaties,
federal statutes and applicable legal precedents." 508 F.2d at 704. The
court ruled that: "In the case sub judice we are not without legislative
guidance in. ascertaining the public policy applicable to the particular
situation here presented. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
Congress' formulation of public policy." Id.
34. 508 F.2d at 706.
35. Title VII specifically provides for the establishment and main-
tenance of bona fide seniority systems. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), at
note 5 supra. The legislative history of Title VII indicates the concern in
Congress about the retention of seniority systems under Title VII. The
Interpretive Memorandum of Senators Clark and Case, floor managers for
the Title VII bill in the Senate provides in part: "Title VII would have no
effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not
retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating
in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title
comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future
vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or in-
deed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer
1975]
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[Tin light of the legislative history . . . on balance a facially neutral
company-wide seniority system, without more, is a bona fide seniority system
and will be sustained even though it may operate to the disadvantage of
females and minority groups as a result of past employment practices. If a
remedy is to be provided alleviating the effects of past discrimination perpet-
uated by layoffs in reverse order of seniority, we believe such remedy must
be prescribed by the legislature and not by judicial decree.',
Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them
special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier
. " 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (April 8, 1964), cited in 508 F.2d at 707.
Senator Clark further commented upon the status of employee seniority
under Title VII in response to a series of written interrogatories posed by
Senator Dirksen. "Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect
to promotions, when that management function is governed by a labor
contract calling for promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismiss-
als? Normally, labor contracts call for 'last hired, first fired.' If the last
hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires
that they be first fired and the remaining employees are white? Answer.
Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a 'last hired,
first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,' he can still
be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired' and
not because of his race. Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his
employment list because of discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to
change existing seniority lists." 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (Apr. 8, 1964), cited
in 508 F.2d at 707-08. Senator Clark also had entered into the record an
advisory memorandum by the Department of Justice which also dealt with
the issue of seniority rights under Title VII which opined: "Title VII would
have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect. If, for
example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of
layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision
would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in
the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the
title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes. . . .It is perfectly
clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion
because under established seniority rules he is low man on the totem pole
he is not being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the
seniority rule itself was discriminatory, it would be unlawful under Title
VII. . . .But in the ordinary case, assuming that seniority were built up
over a period of time during which Negroes were not hired, these rights
would not be set aside by the taking effect of Title VII ... " 110 CONG.
REc. 7207 (Apr. 8, 1964), cited in 508 F.2d at 708.
36. 508 F.2d at 710. Though the court seems to be making a forceful
argument for plant wide seniority systems despite the disproportionate
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Seniority systems calling for layoffs to be conducted in reverse
order of seniority, "last hired, first fired," have been the subject of
a great deal of recent interest in the press and in the courts."
In Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 2369,11
effect such systems might have on newly hired minority workers, it care-
fully limits its ruling. The court was apparently concerned with determin-
ing such an important Title VII issue where the facts before the court were
framed in the context of a declaratory judgment action. The court indi-
cates that if the issues were framed in a more traditional Title VII com-
plaint, e.g. a laid off minority worker suing for reinstatement and back
pay, a different result might have been reached: "Here, with the meager
record before us and considering the manner in which the issues are
framed, we need not, and indeed could not, decide whether any different
result would obtain in an action brought by an aggrieved party ....
What we decide here can obviously affect and bind only the parties present
in this litigation. Of the parties before us, none has offered evidence to
prove that the seniority provisions are not bona fide." Id.
37. See Job Discrimination, 10 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974,
§ 3, at 1, discussing the conflicts arising between union collective bar-
gaining agreements and various federal and state affirmative action pro-
grams. When asked his solution to this problem, Mr. John H. Powell, Jr.,
Chairman of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
stated: "The question of what is the equitable remedy turns on the facts
of every case. There might be cases where the expectations of the white
majority might have to be modified." Id. at 5, col. 3. Issue and Debate:
Recession Layoffs and the Civil Rights of Minorities, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
1975, at 17. This article also treats the subject of seniority system-
affirmative action program conflicts and includes synopses of the most
recently decided cases on the subject. In discussing the importance of the
concept of seniority to union job security, Mr. William E. Pollard, Director
of the Civil Rights Office of the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations opined: "Seniority is one of the most
highly prized possessions of any employee . . . .Although unions can
develop their own local options. . . .we feel a commitment to protect the
workers and the principle of seniority." Who Gets the Pink Slip? TIME,
Feb. 3, 1975 at 50; Recession's Special Victims Newly Hired Blacks,
Women, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1975, § 4 at 1.
38. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La.), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604 (5th
Cir. June 17, 1974). The court noted that "this is the first time that a
federal court has been asked to determine that layoffs and recalls based
on plant seniority are racially discriminatory because of past hiring dis-
crimination against blacks." Id. at 1225. "The Company's [Continental
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the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that a
plant wide seniority system had the effect of "perpetuating past
discrimination" and therefore violated Title VII.11 Watkins involved
a class action by black employees of the Continental Can Company
in Harvey, Louisiana. With the exception of token hiring during
World War II, no blacks had been hired by the company until 1965.
Upon implementation of Title VII, blacks were hired in increasing
numbers and by 1971 there were fifty blacks employed out of a total
work force of 400.40 In 1971, due to adverse economic conditions,
Continental began a series of plant wide layoffs in accordance with
a plant wide seniority system mandated by the collective bargaining
agreement." After the layoffs, only 152 hourly employees, including
the two blacks hired during World War II, remained. 2 Since the
first 138 names on the company's recall list were white, it was con-
ceded that no blacks could expect to be hired for several years. 3
Plaintiffs contended that they had been precluded from obtaining
employment with Continental until Title VII came into effect, and
thus were unable to accrue the requisite seniority to protect their
jobs." Plaintiffs maintained that by basing the layoffs on seniority,
the defendants were perpetuating the effect of past discriminatory
hiring practices which Title VII had been enacted to rectify. 5
The Watkins court found that Continental and the union had
been guilty of discriminatory labor practices proscribed by Title
VII.11 It concluded that no system of job classification or seniority
could stand where minorities were unable to protect their jobs or
seek advancement due to past discrimination practices which de-
nied them the opportunity to obtain requisite seniority or job experi-
Can] history of racial discrimination in hiring makes it impossible now for
blacks (other than the original 2 [hired during World War ]I]) to have
sufficient seniority to withstand layoffs. In this situation, the selection of
employees for layoff on the basis of seniority unlawfully perpetuates the
effects of past discrimination." Id. at 1226.
39. Id. at 1224.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1223.
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ence to protect their jobs.47
The court deferred its decision as to the remedy to allow the
parties to work out a suitable plan which "should involve the min-
imum alteration of existing industrial practices that is consistent
with redressing the discrimination present . ".4..8
The Watkins court relied upon Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc."9 In
Quarles, seniority systems which were based upon the length of an
employee's service in a particular job classification or department
were ruled invalid under Title VII.50 The Watkins court concluded:
47. Id. at 1226.
48. Id. at 1232. The court stated that "[p~lant seniority and recall
rights should not be eliminated, but should be modified only to the extent
necessary to effect this end." Id. The court opined that the "best" remedy
would involve an "apportionment of layoffs among whites and blacks on
the basis of the proportion of each group to the total work force. Then the
employees to be laid off could be selected within each racial group on the
basis of plant seniority." Id. Other remedies which the court suggested
included compensatory lump sum payments to laid off workers and reduc-
ing the total workweek for the entire work force. Id. For further discussion
of remedies to be utilized in effectuating work force reductions, see notes
82-98 infra and accompanying text. The parties were unable to resolve the
dispute satisfactorily and the case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. See
note 38 supra.
49. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
50. Quarles and others brought a class action in federal district court
claiming that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the Phillip Morris Co. and Local 203 of the Tobacco Workers Int'l.
Union were violative of Title VII. The Phillip Morris cigarette and tobacco
manufacturing operations in Richmond, Virginia were divided into four
main departments. Prior to the implementation of Title VII, the employee
population of the former two departments was almost exclusively black,
while composition of the remaining two departments was overwhelmingly
white. Id. at 507-08. Prior to 1966, the collective bargaining agreement in
force between the union and Phillip Morris contained no provisions for
interdepartmental transfers. On March 6, 1966, under pressure from the
EEOC, the union and the company amended their agreement to allow
limited interdepartmental transfers. In addition, due to increased hiring
of minorities, the minority population of the two formerly exclusively white
departments increased to 14 percent and 12.9 percent. Quarles had been
employed in the prefabrication department as a laborer for a period of nine
years. His salary was $2.22 per hour. He desired to transfer into the ware-
house department where he hoped to obtain a job as a truckdriver at a
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salary of $2.58 per hour. The gravamen of Quarles' complaint was that
even if he were allowed to transfer departments, he still would be unable
to obtain the truck driver's job since under the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, he would have to give up all his prior earned senior-
ity and become the most junior employee in his new department. Id. at
514. The court examined the legislative history of Title VII and opined that
although Title VII did indeed preserve previously existing seniority rights,
only "bona fide" systems were to be preserved: "[Title VII] declares that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards pursuant to a bona fide seniority system '. . . provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate be-
cause of race.' The differences between the terms and conditions of em-
ployment for white [sic] and Negroes about which plaintiffs complain are
the result of an intention to discriminate in hiring policies on the basis of
race before January 1, 1966. The differences that originated before the act
are maintained now. The act does not condone present differences that are
the result of intention to discriminate before the effective date of the act,
although such a provision could have been included in the act had Con-
gress so intended. The court holds that the present differences in depart-
mental seniority of Negroes and white [sic] that result from the com-
pany's intentional, racially discriminatory hiring policy before January 1,
1966 are not validated by [Title VII]." Id. at 517-18. Significantly, the
court specifically cites the lack of a legislative mandate to construe the
provisions of Title VII as broadly as it did in invalidating the departmental
seniority system. The court in Jersey Central refused to invalidate the
seniority system in force because it claimed it needed a more specific
legislative mandate. See also Bing v. Roadway Express Co., 485 F.2d 441
(5th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La.
1974). For other cases invalidating departmental seniority systems, see
United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers Union, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), citing Quarles, and holding
that the departmental seniority system violated Title VII and should be
replaced with a seniority system based on mill wide seniority. See also
United States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) in which the court held that: "continued use
of the craft and class seniority systems to restrict the transfer and promo-
tion opportunities of incumbent black employees at the Terminal is nei-
ther bona fide [as required by Title VII] nor a business necessity: such
systems necessarily exclude blacks from jobs for which they might other-
wise qualify." Id. at 453. United States v. N.L. Ind. Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th
Cir. 1973), holding that a dual seniority system providing for plant wide
seniority for company provided insurance and annuity benefits coupled
with departmental seniority for job classification and promotional benefits
was proscribed under Title VII.
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In these cases, where the affected class was composed of long standing-but
previously segregated-black employees, the defendants were ordered to
adopt a seniority standard based on total length of service. Plant seniority
was held to be a racially neutral standard in those cases, not because it is
per se valid, but because blacks had not been excluded from the plant (as
distinct from certain departments or jobs) and thus had been able to earn
plant seniority."
The Watkins court also relied on court decisions invalidating
union referral systems based on seniority."2 In most construction
trades, employee hiring for individual jobs is accomplished by refer-
rals from union "shape-up" halls.53 Prior to Title VII, many con-
struction unions engaged in discriminatory admission practices.54
After Title VII forced these unions to alter their admission policies,
the unions still prevented newly hired workers from obtaining any
actual employment by basing their referrals on seniority within the
union.5 Since most of the minority union members were also the
most junior, they were effectively precluded from job assignments.
The Watkins court indicated that in these cases, courts uniformly
held such referral systems violative of Title VII.'
51. 369 F. Supp. at 1226 (citation omitted).
52. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969), holding that job referrals, apprenticeship training, and promotional
examinations administered by defendant union violated Title VII; Dob-
bins v. Local No. 212, EWU, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968), invalidat-
ing separate referral standards for newly admitted black union members
and more senior white members; EEOC v. Local No. 180, Plumbers and
Pipe United Ass'n., 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1971).
53. For a discussion of hiring practices and referral systems in the
construction trades as well as a history of past discriminatory practices
utilized by these unions, see Hain, Black Workers Versus White Unions:
Alternate Strategies in the Construction Industry, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 37
(1969); Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An
Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1970); Note,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Minority Group Entry into
the Building Trade Unions, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 328 (1969).
54. See generally sources cited in note 53 supra.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 369 F. Supp. at 1226. See also Dobbins v. Local No. 212, EWU, 292
F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968), where the court held: "A policy of giving
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Other cases have disagreed with the conclusions reached in
Watkins.5 In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Har-
vester Company," the Seventh Circuit concluded that the seniority
system in question was plant wide, "facially neutral," and accep-
table under Title VII.1 Nevertheless the court concluded that em-
ployers must exercise "discretion" in devising employment systems,
including those based on plant wide seniority." Unlike the Watkins
court, the Waters court offered no guidance as to how such a "dis-
crete" seniority system was to be implemented.2
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. ," the Fifth Circuit had
little difficulty granting relief for such proscribed employment prac-
tices as discriminatory departmental seniority systems or failing to
hire or promote employees on the basis of race." The court held,
however, that Title VII did not afford unlimited relief, and refused
to create "fictional" or "constructive" seniority based upon the date
some applicants were refused employment on the basis of race.65
priority in work referrals to persons who have experience under the
Local's Collective Bargaining Agreement is discriminatory when compe-
tent [Negroes] have previously been denied the opportunity to work
under the referral agreement by reason of their race." Id. at 445.
58. Although Watkins was cited by Jersey Central, the court stated
that "we do not agree with its analysis." 508 F.2d at 707 n.56.
59. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975).
60. "We are of the view that Wisconsin Steel's employment seniority
system embodying the 'last hired, first fired' principle of seniority is not
of itself racially discriminatory nor does it have the effect of perpetuating
prior racial discrimination in violation of the strictures of Title VII." 502
F.2d at 1318.
61. "We are not, however, insensitive to the plaintiffs' argument, and
think employers should be discrete in devising an employment seniority
system. We recognize that it is a fine line we draw between plaintiffs' claim
of discrimination and defendants' countercharge of reverse discrimina-
tion." Id. at 1320. Compare 508 F.2d at 710.
62. 502 F.2d at 1320.
63. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bowman Trans. Co.
v. Franks, 43 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1974).
64. 495 F.2d at 416-17. The court followed the same line of reasoning
as had been followed in Quarles and its progeny. The court held that black
employees would be able to apply their plant wide seniority to establish
the requisite seniority needed to transfer into the jobs they desired.
65. Id. at 417-18.
[Vol. III
CASE NOTES
In seeking application-date seniority . . . appellants ask us to take a giant
step beyond permitting job competition on the basis of company seniority.
They ask us to create constructive seniority for applicants who have never
worked for the company. Granting that the black . . . applicants who were
rejected on racial grounds suffered a wrong, we do not believe that Title VII
permits the extension of constructive seniority to them as a remedy ...
'It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional seniority for
newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing for it to require that time
actually worked in Negro jobs [within the company] be given equal status
with time worked in white jobs. . . .[C]reating fictional employment time
for newly-hired Negroes would constitute preferential rather than remedial
treatment.'
The Courts in Jersey Central, Waters, and Franks concluded that
the creation of fictional seniority would constitute "preferential
treatment" for minorities rather than promoting equal employment
opportunities. 7 Nevertheless, the principle of extending such "pref-
erential treatment" has been firmly established by other judicial
precedent. 8 In addition, "preferential treatment" toward minorities
66. Id.
67. 508 F.2d at 32-33.
68. See Contractors Ass'n. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971). This case involved a challenge to the "Philadelphia Plan" as being
violative of Title VII and the United States Constitution. On June 27,
1969, pursuant to his authority under Executive Order 12246 (see note 6
supra), the Secretary of Labor issued a regulation entitled the "Revised
Philadelphia Plan." The Plan required each prospective bidder and con-
tractor to "federally assisted" construction projects where the total esti-
mated cost would exceed $500,000 to submit with his bid an "affirmative
action program" which set specific goals for "minority manpower utiliza-
tion." The standards which this program had to meet -were promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor on September 23, 1969. 311 F. Supp. at 1004-
05. The "ranges" within which these goals were expected to reach were as
follows: "[I]n the first year employment 'ranges' [should] vary between
four (4) and nine (9) percent; in the second year between nine (9) and fif-
teen (15) percent; in the third year between fourteen (14) and (20) twenty
percent; and in the fourth and last year between nineteen (19) and twenty-
six (26) percent . . . ." Id. at 1005. The plaintiffs alleged that the Plan
was violative of Title VII in that it required hiring to be, "on the basis of
and with regard to race, color and national origin." Id. at 1009. In holding
that the Plan did not conflict with Title VII, the district court held: "The
Court is of the opinion that the Plan is not in conflict with the provisions
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in labor contracts and hiring practices has been legislatively sanc-
tioned by Title VI116 and upheld by the Supreme Court.7 0
In Jersey Central, the court relied on the legislative approval of
bona fide seniority systems.7 The court failed to deal adequately
of the Civil Rights Act . . . . If there is any one lesson that loomed above
the others it is that the Civil Rights Act and the Executive Orders both
have a common purpose to assure to all an equal chance for employ-
ment. . . . The Plan does not require the contractors to hire a definite
percentage of 'a minority group. To the contrary, it merely requires that
he makes every good faith effort to meet his commitment to attain certain
goals. If a contractor is unable to meet the goal but has exhibited good
faith, then the imposition of sanctions, in our opinion, would be improper
. . . . Id. at 1008-10. See also Associated Gen. Cont. of Mass., Inc. v.
Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974),
upholding a similar affirmative action hiring plan. The courts have gone
far beyond the "merely" making a "good faith effort" to achieve the per-
centage goals standard expressed in the Philadelphia Plan case. Recent
decisions have required an exact percentage of minorities to be hired until
certain numeric quotas have been satisfied. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d. 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972),
mandating that the City of Minneapolis hire two minority persons for
every one non-minority person until the municipal fire department con-
tained 20 qualified minority persons; Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Mem-
bers of the Bridgeport Civ. Ser. Comm'n., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973),
affirming the imposition of affirmative action quotas in which half of all
future patrolmen hired by the Bridgeport, Connecticut police department
were to be blacks and Puerto Ricans until the total number of such minori-
ties on the force numbered fifty. See Comment, The Infirmities of Affirma-
tive Action: The New York City Plan, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 305 (1974).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) states: "Nothing contained in this subchap-
ter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reserva-
tion with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such
business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to
any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation."
70. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). In upholding this statute's
constitutionality in the face of a challenge by a class of non-Indian em-
ployees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs the Supreme Court said: "[Sec-
tion 2000e-2(i)] explicitly exempted from its coverage the preferential
employment of Indians by Indian tribes or by industries located on or near
Indian reservations . . . . This exemption reveals a clear congressional
recognition, within the framework of Title VII, of the unique legal status
of tribal and reservation-based activities." Id. at 545-46. Though Morton
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with the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power
Company," in which the Court ruled that a legislatively sanctioned
employment practice may still be found to be violative of Title VII.13
Griggs involved a challenge to the defendant company's depart-
mental transfer policies. Prior to Title VII, the defendant main-
tained a segregated work force. 5 After 1965, employees were allowed
to transfer into the more desirable departments only upon presenta-
tion of a high school diploma or the passing of company adminis-
tered aptitude tests." Whites already in the more desirable depart-
ments did not have to meet these qualifications to retain their jobs."
The defendant relied upon the provisions of Title VII 8 which specifi-
cally allowed the administration of aptitude tests to aid employers
in employee selection."
The Court rejected these contentions and ruled the testing re-
quirements invalid since the defendant failed to show any "de-
deals with a small class-American Indians, it represents the principle
that "preferential treatment" for minorities is not per se unconstitu-
tional.
71. 508 F.2d at 709-10.
72. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
73. Id. at 429-31.
74. Id. at 427.
75. Id. at 426-27.
76. Id. at 427.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 433 n.9. The defendant relied upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
which provides in part: "nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
79. The interpretive memorandum offered by Senators Clark and Case
concerning employer administered testing stated: "There is no require-
ment in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide qualification tests
where, because of differences in background and education, members of
some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members of
other groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes,
he may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications, and
may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test performance." 110 CONG.
REc. 7213 (Apr. 8, 1964), cited in 401 U.S. at 435 n.11.
19751
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
monstrable connection" between the tests and the requirements of
the applicable job classifications."
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze'
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. . . . The Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."
In Jersey Central, the court of appeals had to determine the ex-
tent to which non-minority rights were to be sacrificed to minority
expectations. Applying the holding of Griggs, in order to invalidate
the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement it
would be necessary to show that there is no "demonstrable connec-
tion" between the seniority system and any "business necessity" of
the employer.
It has been suggested that a four tier test be employed for deter-
mining whether an employment practice meets the Griggs standard
of "business necessity.""2 First a court must determine whether the
employment practice in question is facially neutral. 3 The plant-
wide seniority system present in Jersey Central appears to meet this
test and such systems have received repeated judicial approval.84
Next, the court must consider whether the practice has a disparate
impact on minority employees.85 Although the conciliation agree-
ment in Jersey Central contained a specific disclaimer of past dis-
criminatory practices," the record of the court clearly indicates the
disproportionate effect of seniority based layoffs on minority work-
ers.
8 7
Third, a court must determine whether an employment practice
80. 401 U.S. at 431; see generally 1 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 252 (1972).
81. 401 U.S. at 430-31.
82. Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974) (hereinafter
cited as Business Necessity).
83. Id. at 107.
84. 508 F.2d at 706-09.
85. Business Necessity 107.
86. 508 F.2d at 694.
87. Id. at 697.
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serves a valid business purpose.8
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the benefi-
cial effects of seniority systems for workers.89 Seniority systems tend
to eliminate subjective decisions by employers and supervisors with
respect to promotions and layoffs. 0 They provide union officials and
employers with an objective standard to aid in settling disputes.9
Most importantly, seniority systems provide workers with job secu-
rity." Employers also benefit from seniority systems by securing
lower turnover rates and providing objective criteria upon which to
base retention and promotional decisions. 3
Finally, a court must consider the availability of alternate prac-
tices which would achieve the same business purposes with a less
disparate impact on minority workers. 4 In both Watkins" and the
district court opinion in Jersey Central," the courts refused to man-
date any remedy which would include the laying off of incumbent
non-minority workers. Nevertheless, in order to decrease the impact
88. Business Necessity 107-13.
89. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of
Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Aaron]; Cooper and Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Sobel];
Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as New Developments].
90. Cooper & Sobel 1604.
91. Id. at 1604; New Developments 1157.
92. Aaron 1535; Cooper & Sobel 1605; New Developments 1157.
93. Cooper & Sobel 1606-7; New Developments 1157.
94. Business Necessity 113-15.
95. 369 F. Supp. at 1232.
96. 8 E.P.D. 9759. See also Cooper & Sobel 1606 n. 21. "This does
not necessarily mean that white employees should be removed from theirjobs. Although by retaining jobs acquired on a discriminatory basis, white
employees in one sense benefit from prior discrimination, it is unclear
whether there is in such a case any employment decision as to which a fair
employment law is operative. The legal placement of a white in a job, even
on a discriminatory basis, may be viewed as a closed transaction as to
which the emphasis in the legislative history [of Title VII] on non-
retroactivity would be applicable. In view of the practical consequences of
a contrary interpretation, this view has substantial merit." Id.
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of layoffs on minority workers while preserving non-minority jobs,
a new method of affectuating work force reductions is needed.
One promising proposal for dealing with this problem is a system
of "work allocation." 7 Under such a system, the impact of work
force reductions would be spread through a greater portion of the
work force by such measures as reductions in the length of work
days, the imposition of four or even three day weeks, and rotational
layoffs in which groups of workers would be temporarily laid off and
then recalled. 8
Work allocation programs have the further advantage of preserv-
ing basically intact the "business purposes" of seniority systems in
that workers still retain the benefits of job security while employers
can implement such programs so that their impact falls least heav-
ily on "senior" employees."
After the decision in Jersey Central, it is difficult to determine
how far courts will go in applying Title VII to remedy the effects of
discriminatory labor practices. As has been illustrated, courts have
had little difficulty invalidating departmental seniority systems 00
and discriminatory union referral systems.' 0' In addition, courts
have designated quotas of blacks and other minorities to be hired
in preference to equally qualified non-minorities. 10
97. See Cooper & Sobel 1635-36. Work allocation systems are also sup-
ported by Mr. Gustav Heninburg of the Greater Newark Urban Coalition.
In a recent interview, Mr. Heninburg stated "[work allocation] can mean
almost anything, depending on what kind of industry it is. It may mean 4
1/2-day work weeks, or 4-day work weeks. It may mean giving up vacation
days.. It may mean a whole range of things which are designed to keep
everybody working. Everybody may work a little bit less, but everybody
continues to work." N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 10, 1975, at 19, col. 2.
98. Id.
99. See notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text. The greatest benefit
of work allocation programs is keeping workers on the job. Workers who
have accrued seniority could have their work periods curtailed the least,
while the more "junior" employees would work comparatively less. The
objective benefits of seniority systems would still be available to employers
and unions in making these selections, but junior workers would have the
advantage of retaining their jobs.
100. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
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Courts have refused to rule that incumbent non-minority workers
must give up their jobs to allow minorities to remain employed.0 3
Until definitive guidelines are established by either judicial or legis-
lative action,0 4 work allocation systems appear to be the most equi-
table alternative to seniority based layoffs.
Ira E. Goldberg
103. See notes 95-96 supra.
104. The Supreme Court has finally decided to rule on this issue in
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. March 25, 1975) (No. 74-728).

